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Bigotry, Jury Failures, and the Supreme
Court's Feeble Response
GEORGE C. THOMAS IIIt
INTRODUCTION

Early in the twentieth century, the United States
Supreme Court faced five examples of fundamental failures
in the criminal jury process.' In one case, the Court did
nothing. In four cases, the Court attempted to intervene to
save defendants who were probably innocent. In three of
those cases, the Court provided relief, though ultimately
defendants in each case served years in prison despite the
Court's intervention. In one case, a lynch mob murdered the
defendant after the Court had begun its intervention and
before it could hear the case.
When we examine these cases, four questions naturally
arise. First, how could jurors convict on such weak evidence
in capital cases? Were the jurors evil or corrupt, or was a
more complex phenomenon at work? Second, why didn't the
state courts provide remedies for these probably-innocent
defendants? Third, why didn't the Supreme Court do more?
Its intervention in one case was a weak response that did
nothing to protect defendants from jury bigotry in future
cases. In a second case, the intervention provided a partial
remedy to the worst kind of abuses, but really only sent a
message to the authorities to be more discreet when forcing
black suspects to confess. The fourth question is the most
important in a DNA era: Why has the Court still done
t Distinguished Professor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh Distinguished
Scholar, Rutgers University, Newark.
1. Michael Klarman has written eloquently about four of these cases.
Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99
MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000). His interest was in seeing the connections between
these cases and the criminal procedure doctrine that the Court would develop.
My interest is asking the difficult question of why the Court has not done more
to protect against jury failures.
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almost nothing to remedy failures in criminal jury decisionmaking? We know that hundreds-if not thousands-of
failures occur each year, and still the Court sits on its
hands. This Essay will conclude that the time has finally
come for the Court to face the problem of jury failures. The
various procedural rights, such as the right to counsel, that
the Court has provided criminal defendants do little to
address the fundamental problem that juries make
mistakes. What is needed, and what this Essay will
recommend, is a mechanism that will screen out convictions
where the risk of innocence is too great to allow the
conviction to stand.
I.

ED JOHNSON

In 1906, Nevada Taylor was twenty-one years old,
blonde, and beautiful. 2 She lived with her father, brothers,
and sister in a cottage in the Chattanooga, Tennessee
Forest Hills Cemetery, where her father was the
groundskeeper. 3 Towering over the cemetery was Lookout
Mountain. At 6:00 P.M. on January 23, she was on her way
home from work as a bookkeeper. 4 It was barely above
freezing, and she took a shortcut to the cemetery. A man
came up from behind her and "hurled her over the fence
into the marble yard" of the cemetery.5 He put a leather
strap around her neck and raped her on the cold ground.6
She later said that she "believed" he was black. When the
newspapers reported the "brutal crime" committed by a
"[n]egro fiend," 7 the city erupted in racist fury.
Two days later, with two black suspects under arrest, a
mob of perhaps 1,500 men gathered ominously around the
county jail, "[f]ierce in its determination to wreak

2. MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURNOF-THE-CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED 100 YEARS OF FEDERALISM 24
(1999).

3. Id. at 25.
4. Id.; see also Awful Crime at St. Elmo, CHATTANOOGA DAILY TIMES, Jan. 24,
1906, at 8, available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/
newselmo.html.
5. Brutal Crime of Negro Fiend, CHATTANOOGA NEWS, Jan. 24, 1906, at 5.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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vengeance upon some negro, and not caring to any great
The two black suspects were saved
extent what one . . s"8
from lynching by the quick thinking of a criminal court
judge who had earlier that day ordered the sheriff to take
the prisoners to Nashville. Before that truth could be
confirmed by a small group of the lynch mob, the county jail
was badly damaged by bullets and hammers. 9
Lacking any concrete evidence against either suspect,
the sheriff took Miss Taylor to Nashville to visit the jail
where the suspects were being held. There, for about fifteen
minutes, she observed the men, heard their voices, and saw
them walk around the room.10 When the sheriff asked her if
either man was the guilty party, Taylor said that Ed
Johnson was like the attacker as she remembered himthat "it is [her] best knowledge and belief' that he was the
man who had raped her. 1 ' But, as the headline in the next
day's ChattanoogaTimes newspaper conceded, this was not
a completely positive identification.12 The details of the trial
of Ed Johnson will appear in my forthcoming book. 13 For my
purposes here, it suffices to note that the only credible
evidence against Johnson was the testimony of Nevada
Taylor, and she refused to swear that he was the man who
raped her. 14 Instead, she would only say, as she had said in
Nashville, that "[t]o
the best of my knowledge and belief, he
15
man."'
same
the
is
The same judge who had the suspects spirited out of
8. Law and Order Victorious Over Overwhelming Odds, CHATTANOOGA DAILY
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1906, at 1, available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/
projects/ftrials/shipp/newslawandorder.html.
9. CURRIDEN & PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 50-51.
10. Wheels of Justice Turn Fast in St. Elmo Assault Case, CHATTANOOGA
SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 28, 1906, at 10.

11. Id.
12. Id. (utilizing, as a subheading to the article, the phrase "Almost Positive
Identification").
13. GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS (forthcoming

2008).
14. See Ed Johnson Jury Stands 8 to 4 for Conviction: Unable to Reach
Agreement After Several Hours Spent in Deliberation, CHATTANOOGA DAILY
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1906, at 5, available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/

projects/ftrials/shipp/news8to4.html [hereinafter Ed Johnson Jury].
15. Id.
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town appointed three capable, white defense lawyers, who
staged a vigorous defense that included seventeen
witnesses. These witnesses detailed every minute of how
Johnson spent the afternoon when Taylor was raped. 16 If
the defense witnesses were telling the truth, Johnson could
not have been the rapist.
At the conclusion of the trial, one of the jurors
17
exclaimed: "I can't stand it any longer. I can't stand it."'
After the jury was excused, the judge agreed to recall
Taylor to the stand for another identification of the
defendant. The same juror who had exclaimed earlier now
leaned forward in the jury box "with tears streaming down
his face .. and in a voice trembling with emotion, he cried:
'In God's name, Miss Taylor, tell us positively-is that the
guilty negro? Can you say it-can you swear it?' ' 18 She
would say only, "before God, I believe this is the guilty
negro."'19 As she left the witness stand, "[e]vidences of
'20
weeping were heard on every side.
The initial jury deliberations produced a vote of 8-4 for
conviction. At midnight, after four hours of deliberation, the
judge permitted the jurors to go home for the evening. 2 1 The
next morning the vote was 12-0 for conviction. 22 The
headlines in the Chattanooga News for February 9, 1906
said all that needs to be said about the atmosphere in which
Ed Johnson was tried and convicted: "The Jury Finds Ed
Johnson Guilty; He Will Hang for His Fiendish Crime:
Given the Full Benefit of Law, a Human Brute is Convicted.
Announcement Calmly Received in Court Room." 23
Black lawyers represented Johnson vigorously on
16. See Law Taking its Course in the Case of Ed Johnson, CHATTANOOGA
DAILY TIMES, Feb. 7, 1906, at 5.
17. Ed Johnson Jury, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Ed Johnson Sentenced to Die on March 13, CHATTANOOGA DAILY TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1906, at 5, available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/
ftrials/shipp/newsejsenteneced.html.
23. The Jury Finds Ed Johnson Guilty; He Will Hang for His Fiendish
Crime, CHATTANOOGA NEWS, Feb. 9, 1906, at 1.
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appeal. 24 The United States Supreme Court granted a stay
of execution, pending appeal to the Court. That evening the
county sheriff, who was a Confederate veteran of the Civil
War, stepped aside and allowed a lynch mob to break into
the jail. 25 The mob took Johnson to a bridge where he was
lynched and shot fifty times. 26 A white Baptist minister
preached a moving sermon the following Sunday that
examined Chattanooga's soul and found it troubled: "I
maintain that that mob struck more terrible blows at the
heart of our civilization than it inflicted upon Ed Johnson.
27
The beam in our eye has prevented us from seeing this."
Four days after the sermon, the minister's house was
set on fire. 28 Despite the public spectacle that ended in
29
Johnson's death, no arrests were made for his murder.
But the Supreme Court responded to the defiance of its
order by holding a criminal trial of the sheriff and twentyfive of his deputies. The sheriff told the newspapers that
the lynching was the fault of the Supreme Court. 30 He said
that the people of his county were willing to let the law take
its course, "until it became known that the case would not
probably be disposed of for four or five years by the
[S]upreme [C]ourt of the United States. The people would
not submit to this and I do not wonder at it. '' 31
The Court found the sheriff and five others guilty of
24. See CURRIDEN & PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 4-17.
25. "God Bless You All-I

Am Innocent," Ed Johnson's Last Words Before

Being Shot to Death By a Mob Like a Dog, Majesty of the Law Outraged by
Lynchers, Mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States Disregardedand
Red Riot Rampant, Terrible and Tragic Vengeance Bows City's Head in Shame,
CHATTANOOGA DAILY TIMES, Mar. 20, 1906, at 1.

26. Id.
27. Dr. Howard E. Jones, Minister, First Baptist Church in Chattanooga, A
Chattanooga Sermon on the Lynching of Ed Johnson (Mar. 25, 1906), available
at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/sermon.html.
28. A Sermon on Lynching, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/
shipp/sermon.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
29. CURRIDEN & PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 233.
30. Sheriff Shipp Interviewed, Quoted as Laying Blame for Lynching on the
Supreme Court, CHATTANOOGA DAILY TIMES, May 28,

1906, available at

http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/newsshippinter.html
(displaying reprinted versions of several newspaper accounts of the Johnson
case and the surrounding events).
31. Id.
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contempt of court and sentenced them to either sixty or
ninety days. 32 After he finished serving his sentence, Shipp
returned home to be greeted by a crowd of about ten
thousand, who cheered wildly to the tune of "Dixie."33 About
a year after the murder, Nevada Taylor moved with her
family back to her birthplace in Findlay, Ohio. 34 She died
two months later, at the age of twenty-three. 35 News
accounts attributed her death to "nervous prostration
under the very shadow of
incidental to the crime committed
36
Mountain."
Lookout
historic
the
Let us pause to examine some of the lessons of the
Johnson case. First, even 100 years ago in the South, there
were honorable white men who sought justice. The defense
lawyers who put on a vigorous defense were honorable men.
Also honorable was the judge who saved Johnson from the
initial lynch mob and then appointed three able lawyers to
defend him. Honorable, at least up to a point, were the
jurors who begged Taylor to be more certain in her
identification.
Four jurors initially voted not guilty. But after an
evening at home with their families, the four hold-outs
changed their votes. The plain truth is that jurors are less
likely to discharge their fact-finding function accurately
when they are trapped within a racist culture. At the time,
blacks were portrayed as savage brutes who violated
Southern womanhood, causing juries to convict innocent
black men far too often. Miss Taylor believed Ed Johnson
was the black man who raped her. That was enough for the
jury, even for the four jurors who went home the first night
with doubts of Johnson's guilt.

II. LEO FRANK
Another case of jury failure to appear before the Court
was the Leo Frank case. Frank was charged in 1913 with
32. United States v. Shipp, 215 U.S. 580, 580-81 (1909).
33. CURRIDEN & PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 338.
34. Outrage Perpetratedon a Hancock County Girl Results in Death, Miss
Nevada Taylor Dies as Result of Assault, MORNING REPUBLICAN, May 13, 1907,
at 8.
35. Id.
36. Id.

2007]

JURY FAIL URES

953

raping and murdering an employee of his company. The
Atlanta, Georgia case attracted national attention because
Frank was a Jew, and anti-Semitism was on the rise in the
United States. Frank "engaged two of Georgia's outstanding
37
lawyers to defend him" in a trial that lasted four weeks.
The defense "introduced more than two hundred witnesses,
including over one hundred who testified to Frank's good
character, and at least a score who insisted that they would
or
never believe [the prosecution's chief witness] under oath
38
otherwise because of his notorious reputation for lying.
The magnificent defense came to naught. Frank was
convicted and sentenced to death based wholly on
circumstantial evidence offered in a trial that took place,
according to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "'in the
presence of a hostile demonstration and seemingly
dangerous crowd, thought by the presiding judge to be
ready for violence unless a verdict of guilty was
rendered.' 39 The trial judge overruled the post-verdict
defense motion for a new trial while incredibly stating on
the record, "I am not certain of the man's guilt. With all the
thought I have put on this case, I am not thoroughly
convinced that Frank is guilty or innocent."40 What might
explain the peculiar comment is the judge's fear that the
governor "would 'not have enough troops to control the
mob"' if he had ruled differently, 41 but that by signaling his
doubts, he would encourage the state supreme court or the
governor to come to Frank's aid.
Justice Holmes undoubtedly pressed his colleagues in
conference to hear the appeal from the lower court's denial
of Frank's habeas petition. But the Court voted seven to two
not to hear it. A petition for a pardon to Georgia's governor,
John Slaton, was Frank's last hope. After a painstaking
review of the evidence, Slaton concluded that Frank was
innocent. He commuted Frank's sentence to life in prison,
expecting, so he told friends, "that in a short while the truth
37. LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE 37, 52 (1968).
38. Id. at 51.
39. Id. at 109 (quoting Holmes Denies Motion to Set Aside Verdict, ATLANTA
CONST., Nov. 27, 1914, at 5).

40. Id. at 79 (citing Plea Cites Doubts Held by Judge, ATLANTA GEORGIAN,
Nov. 1, 1913, at 1).
41. Id. at 80 (purporting to quote the trial judge as he confided to a friend).
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[of Frank's innocence] would come out ....
Slaton's career in politics was instantly ruined. He had
to call out a battalion of state militia to keep from being
lynched himself.43 Sadly, he sacrificed his career without
saving Frank. A mob of twenty-five men broke into the
state prison, abducted Frank, and hung him. "Hordes of
people made their way" to view Frank's lifeless body and
take pictures. 44 The lynch mob included a "clergyman, two
former Superior Court justices, and an ex-sheriff. . .."45
Perhaps most remarkable of all, the Marietta Journal
and Courier wrote in an editorial: "We regard the hanging
of Leo M. Frank in Cobb [C]ounty as an act of law abiding
citizens." 46 It is difficult for us, today, to understand how a
lynching that denies the governor his right to commute a
sentence can be "an act of law abiding citizens." But, as we
saw in the Johnson case, when a young Southern woman
was raped and men of that era were whipped into a frenzy
by anti-Semitism or racism, they would believe the worst
about the Jew or the black. No rational explanation of
innocence would persuade. It was as if some contour in
their minds prevented them from seeing and perceiving
facts as humans otherwise would.
III. JUSTICE HOLMES GETS HIS WAY: ARKANSAS RACE RIOT
DEFENDANTS WIN HABEAS CLAIM

According to the Supreme Court, whites fired into a
black church during a service in Arkansas on September 30,
1919, and a white man was killed "in the disturbance that
followed . . . . The report of the killing caused great
excitement and was followed by the hunting down and
shooting of many negroes. . ...,47 One hundred and twentytwo blacks were indicted for allegedly taking part in the
42. Id. at 129.
43. See id. at 132.
44. Id. at 143.
45. Id. at 139.
46. Id.

at 145 (citing Leo M. Frank Hanged Here, MARIETTA J. & COURIER,

Aug. 20, 1915, at 1).
47. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923). Historian Richard Cortner's
account of the causes of the riot is far less dogmatic and does not necessarily
exculpate the blacks. RICHARD C. CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH 5-23 (1988).
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for murder-while no whites were
riot-seventy-three
48
indicted.
The petitioners made claims that, if true, persuaded
seven members of the Court that the convictions resulted
from a mob-dominated atmosphere that made a fair trial
impossible. 49 The governor had appointed a committee ' to
50
deal with what the committee called an "insurrection."
The petitioners claimed that the committee prevented a
lynching of the black prisoners in jail by promising to
"execute those found guilty in the form of law." 51 Petitioners
also claimed that evidence of guilt was produced by
whipping and torturing black52witnesses until they would
testify against the defendants.
A single lawyer represented all five defendants. 53 He
did not move to change venue or for separate trials. 54 He
"had no preliminary consultation with the accused, called
no witnesses for the defence [sic] although they could have
been produced, and did not put the defendants on the
stand."55 The trial lasted forty-five minutes and the jury
56
returned a verdict of guilty in "less than five minutes."
Petitioners claimed that "no juryman could have voted for
an acquittal and continued to live in Phillips County and if
acquitted by a jury he
any prisoner by any chance had been
57
could not have escaped the mob."
Holmes had his case for granting a habeas petition.
Unlike Frank's case that lasted for weeks and featured two
hundred defense witnesses, the Arkansas defendants did
not get even the appearance of fairness. But the victory in
the Supreme Court merely opened the door for fact-finding
when the case returned to the federal district court in
Arkansas. Moreover, even if the federal court granted the
48. CORTNER, supra note 47, at 15.

49. See Moore, 261 U.S. at 87, 89-92.
50. Id. at 88.

51. Id. at 88-89.
52. See id. at 89.
53. See id.
54. See id.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 89-90.
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habeas petition, the authorities could re-try the defendants
in a way that provided superficial due process without a
fair determination of guilt or innocence, as in the Johnson
case. But a plea deal was possible because the frenzy that
led to the farcical trial had subsided. The original
prosecutor in the case, now no longer the prosecutor,
admitted to one of the defense lawyers that the Moore
defendants were not the ring-leaders in the race riot and
that he regretted very much that he could58not "reach the
parties who were the leaders of the trouble."
On the advice of their black lawyer, Scipio Africanus
Jones, the Moore defendants agreed to drop their habeas
petition in exchange for the governor commuting their
convictions to second-degree murder with a prison sentence
of twelve years. 59 A little more than a year later, just before
leaving office, the governor granted indefinite furloughs to
61
the Moore defendants. 60 They thus served five years each
and obviously fared better than both Johnson and Frank.
So what message does the Arkansas case send to state
criminal court judges? The only clear message is that the
trial must be, in form, what trials look like. That, of course,
includes lawyers to represent the defendants. That message
did not get through to the trial judge in the cases of the
Scottsboro defendants.
IV. SCOTTSBORO DEFENDANTS
This case is better known than the first three and, at
least superficially, is less of an obvious miscarriage of
justice. Nine black youths were arrested for the rape of two
white women on a train passing through Alabama on its
way to Memphis. Some sense of the racial climate of the
time in Alabama can be gained from the following excerpt
from historian James Goodman's book, Stories of
Scottsboro:

58. CORTNER, supra note 47, at 179.
59. See id. at 181.
60. See id. at 182.
61. The defendants had served three years in prison before the Court
granted their habeas petition. The verdicts and death sentences were handed
down in 1919, id. at 17, and the Court's order reversing the convictions was in
1923.
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Not until the guards took them out of their [jail] cell and lined
them up against a wall and the sheriff brought two white women
by and asked them to point to the boys who had "had them" did
they realize that they had been accused of rape. One of the women,
Victoria Price, pointed to six of them. When the other didn't say a
word, a guard said that "If those six had Miss Price, it stands to
reason that the others had Miss Bates." The boys protested,
insisting they hadn't touched the women, hadn't even seen them
before Paint Rock, when they saw them being led away from the
train. Clarence Norris called the women liars. One of the guards
struck him with his bayonet, cutting to the bone the hand that
Norris put up to shield his face. "Nigger," the guard
hollered, "you
62
know damn well how to talk about white women."

The women testified in great detail at the trial about
the ways the young men raped them again and again. They
testified that they "begged the [n]egroes to quit but the men
ignored them, and even after they finished they stayed in
the car with them, 'telling us they were going to take us
north and make us their women or kill us."' 63 Though most
of the defendants denied raping, or even touching, the
women, the fact that the Alabama jury would believe the
women instead of the men was unsurprising.
Nor was it surprising that the Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions over a single dissent-that of Chief
Justice Anderson. 64 The defendants raised more than two
dozen evidentiary and constitutional claims.6 But with the
testimony of the women uncontradicted in the record, the
Alabama Supreme Court ignored the procedural errors that
moved Anderson to dissent-that the jury was "overawed or
coerced by outside influence, pressure, or conduct"
and that
the defendants were denied effective counsel.6 6
What is a little surprising is the fact that the Supreme
62. JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 5 (1994).

63. Id. at 14 (citing DAN T.
26 (1969)).

CARTER,

SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE

AMERICAN SOUTH

64. Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 213-14 (Ala. 1932); id. at 214-15 (Anderson,
C. J., dissenting); see Patterson v. State, 141 So. 195, 201 (Ala. 1932); Weems v.
State, 141 So. 215, 220-21 (Ala. 1932). One of the convictions was reversed
because the record was silent as to whether the defendant was sixteen years of
age. It was remanded for a determination of that fact. See Powell, 141 So. at
213.
65. See Powell, 141 So. at 204-14.

66. Id. at 214-15 (Anderson, C.J., dissenting).
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Court granted certiorari. Unlike the Johnson, Frank, and
Moore cases, there was, on the surface, no reason to doubt
the accuracy of the verdict. At least part of what troubled
the Court, as its opinion makes clear, was the lack of proper
procedure. 67 Apparently not receiving the message from
Moore that the form of the trial mattered, the trial judge
appointed all the members of the local bar to represent the
defendants, meaning that they effectively had no counsel.
The judge then rushed the case to trial before anyone had a
chance to investigate defenses that might have been
available. After having lost its attempt to save Ed Johnson,
and after seeing the kind of justice dispensed in Moore, it is
a good bet that the Court wanted a prophylaxis that would
minimize the number of suspect jury verdicts from state
courts. Powell v. Alabama provided a perfect vehicle.
Being lawyers themselves, the justices on the Powell
Court seized on the right to counsel as the prophylactic.
Stressing the failure to allow the defendants time to obtain
counsel, the failure to appoint individual lawyers who
would be responsible for the defense, and the lack of time
provided to investigate any possible defense, the Court held
that Alabama had violated the due process clause. 68 As
much sense as the Powell opinion makes when read by
itself, when read in the context of its times, it is an enigma.
Though the Moore defendants did not have effective
counsel, both Ed Johnson and Leo Frank had first-rate
zealous lawyers who laid bare the weaknesses in the State's
case. The problem with "justice" in the bigoted South at
that time was not procedural-it was foundational.
Probably because the lawyers representing the defendants
on appeal in Powell knew that the problem ran deeper than
the lack of lawyers, they asked for two remedies more
directly connected to the accuracy of the outcome.
The Court refused to reach the two foundational claims
of the defendants: (1) an equal protection claim that the
State had "systematically excluded" blacks from the jury,
and (2) a due process claim that the State had denied the
defendants a "fair, impartial and deliberate trial." 69 The
Court would three years later reach the first claim and
67. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-73 (1932).
68. See id. at 71.
69. Id. at 50.
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decide it in the defendants' favor in a case tried on remand
from the Powell reversal. 70 I will return to that issue in a
moment. If the Court had been serious about correcting for
jury failures, it would have decided the due process claim in
the defendants' favor. That would have changed justice in
the South dramatically. Federal courts would have been
charged with reviewing trials for substantive fairness. The
threat to innocent defendants posed by bigoted juries would
have been reduced.
The Court instead put its faith in the prophylactic right
to counsel. Even the prophylaxis was minimal because the
Court essentially limited the right to counsel to the facts of
the case, holding that,
in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel,
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty
of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as
a necessary requisite of due process of law .... 71

Thus, when an indigent robbery defendant requested
counsel a few years later, and the state court refused, the
Court affirmed his conviction because he "was not helpless,
but was a man forty-three years old, of ordinary intelligence
and ability to take care of
his own interests on the trial of
'72
that narrow [alibi] issue.
A more fundamental question is: What good would
effective counsel do for defendants like Ed Johnson, Leo
Frank, the Moore defendants, and the Scottsboro
defendants? Would another jury composed of white
Southern men be more likely to believe the Scottsboro
defendants because they now had a lawyer by their side?
We know the answer in the Scottsboro cases. No jury ever
returned a verdict other than conviction in any of the ten
subsequent trials of the Scottsboro defendants. Five of the
nine defendants were eventually convicted in a way that
withstood appellate review. 73 In all these cases, the
defendants "enjoyed outstanding legal representation in

70. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-93 (1935).
71. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
72. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 472 (1942).
73. See GOODMAN, supra note 62, at 394-96.
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their retrials, yet it made absolutely no difference to the
outcomes. ' 74 Even when Bates recanted and testified, in a
later trial, that none of the defendants had ever touched her
or Price, the jury convicted. 75 With the Southern belief
structure about white women and black men firmly in
place, the jury chose to believe Price and not Bates.
Three years later, in Norris v. Alabama,76 the Court
reached the substantive claim about the exclusion of blacks
from jury pools and ruled, unanimously, in the defendant's
favor.77 An intriguing speculation is that the Court began to
see the futility of providing counsel to black defendants
charged with raping white women in the South. But even
the substantive right to include blacks in jury pools turned
out, in the racist South, not to mean very much. Mississippi
and South Carolina drew jurors from voting lists, and
78
blacks were effectively disenfranchised in the Deep South.
In other states, the law at the time permitted almost
unlimited discretion to choose from the jury pool. Then
there were peremptory challenges that could be used to
strike blacks who made it onto the venire. In one of the
Scottsboro retrials, the venire had twelve blacks out of one
hundred total, but seven requested to be excused and the
other five were struck by challenges.7 9 That Scottsboro
defendant was again tried by an all-white jury.
As for why the Court in Powell rejected the due process
claim that the trial was unfair, I offer three related
speculations. First, evidence to the contrary in Johnson and
Frank notwithstanding, the Court could have believed that
over the general run of cases, counsel would help avoid
unjust convictions. What makes this theory weak is that
the Court severely limited its prophylactic right to counsel.
A second reason the Powell Court might have rejected
the defendants' due process claim was out of fear of the
consequences of insisting that Southern states provide
equal justice to black defendants. After all, the Court had
74. Klarman, supra note 1, at 80.
75. See GOODMAN, supra note 62, at 141-45.

76. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
77. See id. at 599.
78. See Klarman, supra note 1, at 80.
79. Id. at 81.
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seen what happened when they ordered the Tennessee
authorities to keep Ed Johnson safe while the Court
reviewed his case. Michael Klarman puts it this way:
White Alabamians seemed genuinely puzzled at outside criticism
of their handling of the Scottsboro cases. Avoiding a lynching was
"a genuine step forward," and thus was deserving of
commendation, not condemnation. . . . A state member of the
Commission on Interracial Cooperation .. .thought it odd that
Alabama should be criticized for delivering exactly what the
[Commission] had been fighting so hard to accomplishreplacement of lynchings with trials. Several southern newspapers
warned in connection with Scottsboro that if outsiders continued
to assail Alabama after juries had returned guilty verdicts, then
there would
be little incentive to resist a lynching on future
80
occasions.

A third theory is that the Court could not yet escape the
strangle-hold of state sovereignty that it had reaffirmed in
the Slaughter-House Cases.81 It thus saw its options as
severely limited. Today, the power of state sovereignty in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is difficult to
comprehend, but a small window can be opened by reviewing
Plessy v. Ferguson.8 2 Homer Ferguson was only one-eighth
black, but under Louisiana law he was considered nonCaucasian and thus was not permitted to ride in the whiteonly railway cars.8 3 When he ignored an order to vacate, he
was ejected and arrested. Ferguson argued that the law
requiring segregated train cars violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court conceded that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to ensure the
equality of the races under the law.
The Court then offered what is by modern standards a
bizarre legal proposition about blacks and whites: "Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places
where they are liable to be brought into contact, do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the
other .... "84 The Court found:
80. Id. at 57 (quoting and citing CARTER, supra note 63, at 107, 111-13).
81. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
82. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
83. Id. at 540-41.
84. Id. at 544.
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the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored
85
race chooses to put that construction upon it.

Only Justice John Marshall Harlan saw the corrosive
effect of segregation. Dissenting alone, he wrote:
The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly
linked together, and the interests of both require that the common
government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be
planted under the sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse
race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of
distrust between these races, than state enactments which, in fact,
proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and
degraded that they cannot
be allowed to sit in public coaches
86
occupied by white citizens?

The majority's willingness to tolerate overt racism
imposed by force of law is inexplicable to us today. I do not
doubt that at least some of the justices in the majority
subscribed to the nineteenth century view that blacks were
inferior to whites. Still, I think it would be a mistake not to
take the majority at its word. The Fourteenth Amendment
issue, the Court said, was "whether the statute of Louisiana
is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there
must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the
legislature. '8 7 As far as the 1896 Supreme Court was
concerned, state legislatures were "at liberty to act with
reference to the established usages, customs and traditions
of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their
comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good
order."88
When facing the twin powers of racism and state
sovereignty, Homer Ferguson could not prevail. Nor could
the Scottsboro defendants persuade the Court to give
federal courts broad review power over state criminal trials.
Instead, the Scottsboro defendants received a minimalist
85. Id. at 551.
86. Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 550.
88. Id.
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procedural solution designed to reverse their convictions
and do precious little to help other black defendants in the
South. Indeed, the next case is a truly fundamental failure
of justice that occurred two years after Powell was decided.
V.

BROWN V. MISSISSIPPI

In 1934, a white man was killed by blows from an axe.
Exactly one week later, three black men had been arrested,
indicted, convicted of murder, and sentenced to hang.8 9 The
defendants were represented by four court-appointed
lawyers, 90 and the trial transcript reveals that defense
counsel represented their clients zealously and effectively. 91
The defendants' confessions were the prosecution's chief
evidence, and the defense established that the confessions
were tortured from the defendants. 92 Yet the jury convicted
and sentenced the defendants to hang. So much for the
Powell solution to Southern bigotry manifesting itself in
criminal trials.
The Court in Brown v. Mississippi presented the facts
about the torture by quoting from the dissent in the state
supreme court opinion. I quote at length from these facts
because no summary does justice to the depravity of the
conduct sanctioned by the deputy.
Dial, a deputy sheriff, accompanied by others, came to the home of
Ellington, one of the defendants, and requested him to accompany
them to the house of the deceased, and there a number of white
men were gathered, who began to accuse the defendant of the
crime. Upon his denial they seized him, and with the participation
of the deputy they hanged him by a rope to the limb of a tree, and,
having let him down, they hung him again, and when he was let
down the second time, and he still protested his innocence, he was
tied to a tree and whipped, and, still declining to accede to the
demands that he confess, he was finally released, and he returned
with some difficulty to his home, suffering intense pain and agony.
The record of the testimony shows that the signs of the rope on his
neck were plainly visible during the so-called trial. A day or two
thereafter the said deputy, accompanied by another, returned to
89. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO" CASE IN MISSISSIPPI 11 (1986).
90. Id. at 10-11.
91. See generally Transcript of Record on Writ of Certiorari, Brown v. State,
173 Miss. 542 (No. 301) [hereinafter Transcript of Record].
92. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936).
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the home of the said defendant and arrested him, and departed
with the prisoner towards the jail in an adjoining county, but went
by a route which led into the state of Alabama; and while on the
way, in that state, the deputy stopped and again severely whipped
the defendant, declaring that he would continue the whipping
until he confessed, and the defendant then agreed to confess to
such a statement as the deputy would dictate, and he did so, after
which he was delivered to jail.
The other two defendants, Ed Brown and Henry Shields, were
also arrested and taken to the same jail. On Sunday night, April 1,
1934, the same deputy, accompanied by a number of white men,
one of whom was also an officer, and by the jailer, came to the jail,
and the two last named defendants were made to strip and they
were laid over chairs and their backs were cut to pieces with a
leather strap with buckles on it, and they were likewise made by
the said deputy definitely to understand that the whipping would
be continued unless and until they confessed, and not only
confessed, but confessed in every matter of detail as demanded by
those present; and in this manner the defendants confessed the
crime, and, as the whippings progressed and were repeated, they
changed or adjusted their confession in all particulars of detail so
93
as to conform to the demands of their torturers.

Even for someone who grew up in the South in the
1950s and saw overt racism as often as I did, these facts are
difficult to comprehend. But the truly incomprehensible fact
is that twelve men convicted the defendants and sentenced
them to die after deliberating for about thirty minutes. 94 To
attempt to be fair, most of the details of the torture were
provided by the defendants' testimony and they had a clear
incentive to exaggerate the brutality of their treatment.
Issues of credibility are always up to the jury, and Brown
would not be quite so horrific a case if that could explain
the convictions. But it cannot. The State offered rebuttal
witnesses after the defendants rested their case. All three
rebuttal witnesses admitted to administering the whippings
while testifying that they did not suggest the details of the
defendants' confessions. 95 The point to this, of course, was
to argue that even though tortured, the defendants were
nonetheless guilty.

93. Id. at 281-82 (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470-71 (1935)
(Griffith, J., dissenting)).
94. See CORTNER, supra note 89, at 10.
95. Brown, 297 U.S. at 284-85.
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Dial, the deputy who had orchestrated the whippings,
was asked how severely one of the defendants had been
whipped in his presence. He responded: "Not too much for a
negro; not as much as I would have done if it were left to
me." 96 As one of the dissenters in the state supreme court
put it:
The facts are not only undisputed, they are admitted, and
admitted to have been done by officers of the state, in conjunction
with other participants, and all this was definitely well known to
everybody connected with the trial, and during the trial, including
97
the state's prosecuting attorney and the trial judge presiding.

Faced with undisputed facts showing relentless torture
to obtain confessions, the jury convicted and the judge
sentenced the men to die.
I understand that the South was more racist in the
1930s than in the 1950s when I was growing up, and that
Mississippi in the 1930s might have been the most racist
state in the nation. Yet I cannot fathom how a juror, a
white man to be sure, could hear this testimony and find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants were guilty.
A technical argument can be offered in defense of the jury
but it is not persuasive. Apparently because the State's
witnesses testified to incriminating remarks made by the
defendants, defense counsel moved to exclude the rebuttal
testimony of the State's witnesses that admitted the
torture. 98 The judge granted the motion. 99 But what juror in
his right mind could disregard the evidence confirming the
gruesome story that the defendants had told on the witness
stand?
Academics have long been skeptical of the ability of a
jury to disregard damning evidence. The more sensational
the evidence, the more difficult it is to disregard. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has deemed it unconstitutional for a
state to use the trial jury to consider whether a confession
is admissible. 100 The rationale is that if a jury heard the
96. Id. at 284.
97. Brown, 161 So. at 471.
98. See Transcript of Record, supra note 91, at 115.
99. Id.
100. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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confession, and decided it had been coerced, it could not
cleanse its mind of the fact that the defendant confessed.
How much harder would it be to cleanse one's mind of the
fact that the deputies admitted the torture that produced
the confessions?
The final argument that can be offered in defense of the
jury verdict was the State's hastily presented fingerprint
evidence. It seems clear from the record that the prosecutor
was surprised when the defendants testified about the
torture. There is no way to know whether he was surprised
because he knew nothing of the torture, or because he had
been assured that the defendants would not mention it
(more about the prosecutor in a moment). But in rebuttal,
the State offered a fingerprint expert who testified that two
prints found near the victim's body matched the prints of
defendant Brown. 10 1 Because the defense was not given a
chance to have its own experts examine the fingerprints, it
is unclear from the trial record how strong the fingerprint
evidence was. Moreover, no fingerprint evidence connected
the other two defendants to the crime, and the jury
convicted them along with Brown.
Is the conclusion that these white male jurors were just
evil, that they endorsed torture of black suspects? That
would not be the way I read Brown. Brown, like Johnson,
manifests a deep belief structure about blacks in the white
South of that era. "Blacks were savages, more savage, many
argued (with scientific theories to support them), than they
had been as slaves. Savages with an irrepressible sex drive
and an appetite for white women. They were born
rapists,
rapists by instinct; given the chance, they struck."'102
With that belief structure firmly in place, the jurors
likely took the bait that the State had offered: the
confessions were true without regard to the torture. It can
be true both that you tortured a confession out of me and
that I told the truth to you. Torture does not exclude truth.
But torture makes truth so unlikely that a fair minded jury
without a fearful, deep belief structure about blacks would
have been unable to forget that the rebuttal witnesses
admitted the torture and thus would have believed the
defendants' torture stories. That fair-minded jury would
101. See Transcript of Record, supra note 91, at 91-93.
102. GOODMAN, supra note 62, at 15.
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have acquitted. But with the belief structure about blacks
in place, juries offered no hope for Ed Johnson or the three
defendants in Brown.
We might be able to understand how juries, acting on a
deep belief structure that lay beneath the surface of their
consciousness, could vote to convict the defendants in
Brown. But what is to be said of the prosecutor? Was he
captured by the same deep belief structure or was he simply
ambitious? The prosecutor was John Stennis, who was
elected to office in Mississippi many times over a sixty year
period. 103 His career culminated in his election to the
United States Senate thirteen years10 4after the Brown case,
where he served for forty-one years.
There is no evidence that John Stennis knew of the
torture prior to trial. But after the rebuttal witnesses
testified, the future senator from Mississippi knew for a fact
that the torture took place. Perhaps he put his faith in the
fingerprint evidence. Perhaps he believed the story that his
witnesses offered: that they had not suggested any details
of the confession to the defendants and that the confessions,
while tortured from the defendants, were nonetheless true.
Perhaps.
And how can we explain the failure of the Mississippi
Supreme Court to order a new trial at which the confessions
would be inadmissible? The majority of three judges, with
little comment on the way the confessions were obtained,
focused on the failure of the defense lawyers to renew their
objections to the confessions after the State offered rebuttal
witnesses. 105 This, the court held by a 3-2 vote, constituted
a waiver. The highest court in the state never even reached
the merits of the claim that the confessions were coerced by
torture. To be sure, at the end of its opinion, the majority
wrote: "Nothing herein said is intended to even remotely
sanction the method by which these confessions were
obtained."'106 But rhetoric is no balm for a death sentence.
Two brave state supreme court judges dissented. Judge
103. See Biographical Information of the United States Congress, Stennis,
John Cornelius, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=SO00852
(last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
104. See id.
105. See Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 467-68 (1935).
106. Id. at 470.
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Griffith rejected the waiver argument, noting that "in
pertinent respects the transcript reads more like pages torn
from some mediaeval account than a record made within
the confines of a modern civilization which aspires to an
enlightened constitutional government." 107 To Judge
Griffith, in a world of torture devices, such as the rack,
relying on legal niceties was not only inappropriate but also
offensive.
Judge Griffith also responded eloquently to the
argument that courts should let hasty, unjust trial
convictions stand because, otherwise, mobs would once
again resort to lynchings. If mobs were going to dominate
the process, he concluded, at least courts should not aid the
mobs in doing their violence and then hypocritically call it
"justice":
It may be that in a rarely occasional case which arouses the
flaming indignation of a whole community, as was the case here,
we shall continue yet for a long time to have outbreaks of the mob
or resorts to its methods. But, if mobs and mob methods must be,
it would be better than their existence and their methods shall be
kept wholly separate from the courts; that there shall be no
blending of the devices of the mob and of the proceedings of the
courts; that what the mob has so nearly completed let them finish;
and that no court shall by adoption give legitimacy to any of the
works of the mob, nor cover by the frills and furbelows of a
pretended legal trial the body of that which in fact is the product
of the mob, and then, by closing the eyes to actualities,
complacently adjudicate that the law of the land has been
observed and preserved. 108

As in Johnson, there were white heroes here. In
addition to the two dissenting judges on the state supreme
court, there was John Clark, who defended the men at trial
and began the appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court. It
seems that he initially believed that the defendants were
guilty, but the testimony about the torture and the
admissions made by the rebuttal witnesses "seared" his
conscience and ultimately caused him to have an emotional
breakdown. 109 At that point his wife, Matilda Floyd Tann
Clark, stepped forward. The Democratic National Committee
107. Id. (Griffith, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 472.
109.

CORTNER, supra note

89, at 43, 60.
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representative from Mississippi, she was "well connected in
Mississippi politics."110 She spoke out in defense of her
husband for waging a 'good fight . . . ,"' noting that
.'[r]acial prejudice runs high here

....

She also said

that 'the justice loving, law abiding people here are in
sympathy with Mr. Clark's efforts but many of them dare
not express their opinions because of inflamed public
112
sentiment."'
More importantly, Matilda Clark persuaded former
governor Earl Brewer to take over the appeal 'for the
purpose of helping right a grievous wrong."' 113 A seasoned,
wily defense counsel, 114 Brewer quickly realized that Clark
had made an error in his appeal to the state supreme court:
he had failed to raise any federal claim. 115 Thus, if the
defendants lost in the state supreme court, no appeal would
be possible to the United States Supreme Court because it
can hear only federal claims. Brewer thus added the
argument that the conviction of defendants using coerced
evidence violated due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1 16 And that, of course, was the argument that
prevailed in the United States Supreme Court and saved
the lives of the three defendants.
Perhaps as important to saving the lives of the
defendants, if somewhat less brave, were the actions taken
by the Mississippi authorities to keep the lynch mobs at
bay. Presumably not wanting to see a reenactment of the
Ed Johnson and Leo Frank cases, the law enforcement
authorities continually provided the defendants with
guards who were heavily armed with machine guns and,
apparently, willing to use them. 117 It is easy, perhaps too
easy, for us to say, "Well, that was their job." White men in
Mississippi in 1934 who were willing to use machine guns
against white men to protect blacks thought guilty of
110. Id. at 46.
111. Id. at 60 (quoting, without attribution, Matilda Clark).
112. Id. (quoting, without attribution, Matilda Clark).
113. Id. at 65 (quoting, without attribution, Matilda Clark).
114. See id. at 68-69.
115. See id. at 74.
116. See id.

117. See id. at 9.
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murdering a white man were at least modestly heroic.
Perhaps it was a sign of progress in race relations in
Mississippi that Brown lost by only one vote in the state
supreme court and that the dissents were written in
emotional tones. The United States Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, with less heat and fury than the
dissenting judges in the state supreme court, but
nonetheless noting: "It would be difficult to conceive of
methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those
taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and
the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for
conviction1 8 and sentence was a clear denial of due
process.'
There was no need for the Court to write an emotional
opinion. All it needed was to remind the reader of the race
of the tortured suspects and the race of the torturers and,
beyond that, only the facts, as Morgan Cloud has described:
The methodical, understated, matter-of-fact language employed in
these passages only amplifies the horror of the deputies' acts.
Hyperbolic adjectives and histrionic arguments were unnecessary.
Nothing was needed but the facts. These facts, presented simply
and directly, were more persuasive than any legal argument ever
of the
could be. Ultimately, the truth of the facts is the source
19
opinion's rhetorical impact-and its moral authority. 1

So the Brown defendants had their convictions vacated
and their cases sent back to the Mississippi courts. Unlike
the Scottsboro defendants, who collectively went through
ten retrials, the Brown defendants worked out plea
bargains and served sentences from three years to seven
years in prison. 120 Historian James Goodman mentions no
pleas offered to the Scottsboro defendants. This makes
sense. In Brown, the strongest evidence of guilt would not
be available at a retrial. But in the Scottsboro case, the
State still had two victims who, in the beginning, were both
effective witnesses. That the Brown defendants accepted
plea deals might tell us that they were guilty. But more
likely, I think, it tells us that the black defendants
understood full well that a white jury would convict even on
118. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
119. Mirgan Cloud, Torture and Truth, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1211, 1215 (1996).
120. See Klarman, supra note 1, at 82.
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the slimmest of evidence. A retrial probably looked to the
Brown defendants like a ticket to the gallows.
But the Brown defendants fared better than the
Scottsboro defendants precisely because the remedy in
Brown was substantive. The confessions could never be
used. The Scottsboro defendants got procedural due
process-the right to have a trial with competent counsel
zealously representing them. That procedural due process
victory gave five of them a lot of heartache and long prison
sentences. The right to have counsel is not very meaningful
if the jury is selected from a pool that has a deep belief in
the criminality of blacks or Jews.
Juries failed Ed Johnson, Leo Frank, the Scottsboro
defendants, and the Brown defendants. It is thus at least a
little ironic that when another likely flawed verdict came to
the Court from a Southern court, the remedy the Court
provided this time was the right to trial by jury. Gary
Duncan, a young black man, was charged with assault on a
white youth that took place near a New Orleans public
school integrated only the month before. According to Alvin
Bronstein, who represented Duncan, the assault charge
arose as follows:
Duncan . .. was driving home from work and passed the school
and saw a bunch of kids on the sidewalk outside of the school. Two
of the boys were his nephews, eleven- and twelve-year-old black
kids who had been among the few to attend the previously
all-white school. He saw that they were surrounded by about five
or six white boys about the same age, and it looked like there was
an incident or that something was going on so he pulled over, got
out, and asked what was happening. There had been a little
pushing and shoving between the kids, and his nephews said the
other boys were taunting and teasing and threatening them. He
said, "Okay, well, get in the car and I'll take you home." He then
said to one of the young white boys, touching12 him
on the elbow,
1
"Go run along and go on home." Just like that.

A witness to this event was a member of the school
board who had opposed integration. 122 He reported an
assault to the police, who investigated and concluded that
121. Alvin J. Bronstein, Representing the Powerless: Lawyers Can Make a
Difference, 49 ME. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997).
122. See id.
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no assault had occurred. 123 Despite the police investigation,
Duncan was arrested for battery, a misdemeanor under
124
Louisiana law that carried a possible two-year penalty.
Louisiana law did not permit jury trials in misdemeanor
cases, and Duncan was thus tried before a judge known to
be a crony of the racist Leander Perez, who was "really the
king or the emperor of Plaquemines Parish, which was an
extraordinarily mineral-wealthy piece of land."'125 Perez
''was one of the people who first began to distribute the
and a number of other
phony Protocols of the Elders of Zion
1 26
publications."'
anti-Semitic
racist,
Naturally, Duncan was convicted. Though it is unclear
whether the Court knew anything about the questionable
justice available in Plaquemines Parish, Duncan's brief set
out the facts leading to the charge, including the races of
the participants and the fact that the black youths had been
transferred to the school under a federal court order to desegregate the New Orleans schools. 127 I believe the Court
granted certiorari because of the racial dimension of the
case. The Court overturned Duncan's conviction on the
ground that the state statute denying a jury trial 28to
someone facing two years in prison was unconstitutional.
Duncan had moved for a jury trial to escape the racist
justice of Leander Perez and his cronies. A jury would be
better than a judge under the control of Perez. But was an
all-white New Orleans jury really a solution to the
substantive injustice that had been done to Duncan? Oddly
enough, Duncan never got his jury trial. When the Supreme
Court sent the case back to the Louisiana courts, the state
legislature, attending to dicta in Duncan about where the
jury trial line would be drawn, amended the battery statute
so that the maximum jail time was six months. 129 Then the
prosecutor charged Duncan with battery under the new

123. See id.
124. See id.

125. Id. at 5.
126. Id. at 6.
127. Brief of Appellant at 3-4, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (No.
410), 1967 Westlaw 113845.
128. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62.
129. See Bronstein, supra note 121, at 12.
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statute. 130 This is not an ex post facto problem because
battery was already against the law. Nor did it violate the
due process rule that a defendant cannot be penalized for
appealing his conviction, 131 because Duncan received a two
month sentence under the old statute
and the most he faced
132
under the new one was six months.
But Louisiana's challenge to federal supremacy was
doomed to failure. It is difficult for those who did not live
through the 1950s and 1960s to appreciate how the
Southern states, in big ways and small, were challenging
the premise of the Supremacy Clause that federal law
prevailed over contrary state law. The federal courts were,
in large part, up to the task of asserting supremacy. A
federal district judge in New Orleans agreed with Bronstein
that the Louisiana officials were acting in bad faith in
Duncan's case and enjoined further prosecution of Gary
Duncan for the battery. 33 Thus, the man whose name is
synonymous with the right to a jury trial never received his
jury trial!
VI. How ARE INNOCENT DEFENDANTS TREATED BY TODAY'S
SUPREME COURT?

Innocent defendants were ill-served by juries in most of
the cases discussed in this Essay. Though it is a small data
set, these cases suggest the wisdom of a meaningful review
of convictions when defendants claim to have been innocent.
The modern Court has not provided the doctrinal tools for a
meaningful review of innocence claims. Now that we know,
with DNA evidence, that innocent defendants are convicted
far too often, it is time for the Court to amend its precedent
on the issue of federal review of state convictions.
Almost all federal review of state convictions is by
means of a habeas corpus petition after state court review is
completed. 134 Most of the time reviewing these petitions is
130. See id.
131. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718 (1969), overruled by

Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
132. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146.

133. Bronstein, supranote 121, at 12-13.
134. The only other route to obtain federal review of a state conviction is for
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari after the state's highest court has
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spent by federal magistrates and district judges. The issue
in Jackson v. Virginia was how much evidence was
sufficient to sustain a state conviction on review in federal
habeas proceedings. 135 The Fourth Circuit relied on
Thompson v. Louisville136 to reject Jackson's claim of
insufficient evidence. Thompson held that a conviction
could not be sustained if the record was completely void of
evidence 137 but did not address the standard for evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence when some evidence had
been introduced. The lower court recognized that Thompson
might not be the Court's final word on reviewing evidence
sufficiency, but finding no Supreme Court guidance other
than Thompson, it applied the "no evidence" rule and
affirmed Jackson's conviction.138 The "no evidence"
standard made the jury trial essentially the only measure of
sufficiency and thus the only hope for innocent defendants.
But, as we have seen, juries can make horrific errors, and
innocent defendants can suffer.
The Court in Jackson thought the risk of erroneous
convictions high enough to require a more searching inquiry
than the "no evidence" rule. Appellate courts must, the
Court said, decide whether "the record evidence could
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."'1 39 This language portends a meaningful review, but
the Court flinched in developing a metric to determine
whether the evidence supported a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
One might logically think that the review of sufficiency
would entail a judgment about whether the transcript
proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. German appellate
courts undertake an independent review of the evidence in
criminal cases that starts over-"hearing the witnesses,
considering afresh the evidence and the law, and giving its
own independent conclusions."' 40 American courts could at
affirmed a conviction but that, obviously, is a relatively rare occurrence because
the Court grants certiorari in only a few criminal cases each year.
135. 443 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1979).
136. 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
137. Id. at 205-06.
138. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 312.
139. Id. at 318.
140. FLOYD FEENEY & JOACHIM HERRMANN, ONE CASE-Two SYSTEMS: A

2007]

JURY FAIL URES

975

least review the trial transcript. But Jackson explicitly
rejected that approach, cautioning that a reviewing court
need not 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence ' 141
at
the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
The Court provided no reason for refusing to require that
kind of meaningful review, but the fear of a heavy burden
on magistrates and federal district courts was surely on the
Court's mind.
Thus, the Court sucked the life from its "reasonable
support" standard with a test that habeas petitioners can
almost never meet. "[T]he relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." 142 Notice the three heavy burdens for petitioners.
The test is whether any rational trier of fact could (not
would) have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. And a
judge applies this extremely deferential standard only after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.
How many innocent defendants could meet that
standard? A precious few, I believe. The Ed Johnson
conviction would likely be affirmed under the Jackson
standard. If you view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, then you reject the credibility
of all the alibi witnesses, and Nevada Taylor's almost
positive identification would provide a basis on which a
rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The Court might be right that it would be a waste of
time for federal judges to conduct a searching inquiry of the
record in every case in which the habeas petitioner
suggested that the evidence was insufficient. That the
German courts perform an even more intensive review
should give us pause, but I suspect that the rate of appeals
is far lower in Germany than here. Even if the Court is
right about the burden in the run-of-the-mill case, it could
carve out an exception for cases where the petitioner makes
COMPARATIVE VIEW OF AMERICAN AND GERMAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 446 (2005).

141. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282
(1966)).
142. Id. at 319.
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a threshold showing of probable innocence.
What the Court did not recognize in Jackson, and still
has not faced, is that review of state convictions should be
conducted differently when a petitioner makes a plausible
claim of innocence. In those cases, the review should be
precisely the one the Court rejected in Jackson-the federal
courts should review the transcript, armed with some
presumption about credibility, and decide whether the
State introduced sufficient evidence of guilt.
The Constitution Project recently made a similar
recommendation in capital cases, calling on appellate courts
to reverse convictions "if a reasonable jury could not have
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'143 While a standard
that low might be appropriate for vacating a death penalty,
I fear that it would release many guilty defendants along
with innocent ones. A more appropriate standard is one
that the Court requires when procedural errors might have
caused a wrongful conviction-when counsel was ineffective
or when the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence. In these cases, the Court instructs lower courts to
reverse the conviction if the error undermines confidence in
the conviction. The failure to turn exculpatory evidence over
to the defense, for example, will require reversal when
there is a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a
probability44 sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."1
The Court's explicit goal when structuring the right to
effective counsel and the right to exculpatory evidence is to
require procedures that advance the accuracy of trial
outcomes. To apply the same standard for reversing
convictions when a defendant makes a substantive claim of
innocence simply recognizes an equivalence between
procedure and substance. Lower courts are familiar with
the standard. It is, to be sure, not very precise, but I trust
appellate courts to apply it in a way that benefits innocent
143. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY
REVISITED, at xx (2005), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/

SummaryMandatoryJusticeRevisitedpdf.
144. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality); see also
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (applying the reasonable probability
standard).
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defendants who make a substantial showing of innocence.
In any event, it is far better than the vacuous Jackson
standard.
To give just due to the jury, whose task it is to
determine credibility, the reviewing court could assume
that whenever there is a conflict in the testimony, that the
prosecution witnesses were telling the truth. Given the
notorious unreliability of eyewitness identifications,
however, and what we know about how often eyewitnesses
help convict innocent defendants, I would not extend the
credibility rule to eyewitnesses. If the contested issue is
what the victim or defendant said, I would construe that to
favor the prosecution witnesses given that the jury
convicted-but not eyewitness testimony.
We can test my proposal by applying it to Ed Johnson's
conviction. Under my proposal, the reviewing court would
assume that Nevada Taylor was telling the truth when she
said she thought he was the man who raped her but the
court would not assume that the alibi witnesses were not
telling the truth. The court would have to ask whether
Taylor's lack of certainty, combined with the many alibi
witnesses, undermined confidence in Johnson's conviction.
It would for me if I were on the reviewing court. Governor
Slaton applied a similar standard to the evidence
in Leo
45
Frank's case and concluded that he was innocent.
This inquiry is, I admit, a much more laborious process
than the minimalist one required by Jackson. Thus, I do not
think that due process requires a review of the evidence
unless the petitioner makes a threshold showing of
probable innocence. A threshold showing could be made by
affidavit detailing evidence that was not presented at trial
or highlighting evidence that was presented and was
ignored-for example, a confession from someone else or a
new witness who can identify someone else as the
perpetrator.
States have their own procedures for investigating
newly-discovered evidence. To some extent, my recommended
change in federal habeas review would just be a backstop to
apply after the state courts have finished their inquiry into
newly-discovered evidence. But I would not require new
evidence to make the threshold showing of innocence. In Ed
145. See supra note 42, and accompanying text.
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Johnson's case, the fact that many witnesses testified that
he was nowhere near Nevada Taylor at 6:00 P.M. on
January 23, 1906 would be enough for me to find the
threshold met. Then I would examine Taylor's testimony.
Finding it somewhat uncertain, my confidence in Johnson's
conviction would be undermined and I would enter an
acquittal.
Jackson was decided in 1979, long before we began to
be aware of how many innocent defendants are convicted.
Estimates vary wildly but we know that the Cardozo
Innocence Project has now proven that 208 innocent men
were convicted. 146 It is time for the Court to recognize the
risk to innocence posed by our criminal process, and to
amend Jackson to require a more searching review in
federal habeas cases when the petitioner makes a threshold
showing of probable innocence.
Will this cause a huge increase in the workload of
appellate courts? I doubt it. In most appeals, guilt is
obvious. Prosecutors tend to plea out or dismiss weak cases.
It should be difficult for guilty defendants to make a
threshold showing or innocence. The more sophisticated our
crime investigation becomes, the more likely it is that solid
physical evidence will link the defendant to the crime, thus
defeating most attempts by guilty defendants to reach the
innocence threshold. The United Kingdom adopted a
somewhat similar system in 1995 and, as of 2001, the
of all cases challenging
reversal rate was only 1.6 percent
47
the sufficiency of the evidence.1
Moreover, I join Blackstone in concluding that it is
better that ten guilty defendants escape justice than that
one innocent person be convicted. Benjamin Franklin, by
the way, upped the ante on Blackstone in a letter in 1785,
stating that "it is better [that] 100 guilty Persons should
148 I
escape than that one innocent Person should suffer."
doubt I would go that far, but I do not think we would even

146. The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/MissionStatement.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
147. Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative
Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1241, 1277 (2001).

148. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughn (Mar. 14, 1785),
in 9 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, at 293 (Albert Henry Smith ed.,
1907).

20071

979

JURY FAIL URES

have to suffer the ten-to-one ratio.
My forthcoming book will argue that the right not to be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law entails the right to have a federal judge review the
sufficiency of evidence when a petitioner has made a
threshold showing of innocence. If Congress were suddenly
imbued with courage, it could of course amend the federal
habeas statute to require a more in-depth review of
innocence. But my money is on the Court.
In 2004, the Court tossed out a quarter century of
precedents to hold that the Sixth Amendment confrontation
clause actually requires the government to produce in court
the witnesses against the defendant instead of relying on
hearsay. 149 While the Court's focus in that case was on the
language of the clause and the history of the right of
confrontation, embedded in the notion of confrontation is
the need to probe damning testimony and thus make
erroneous convictions less likely. Protecting innocence by
overruling bad precedents in the Confrontation Clause area
leads naturally to amending Jackson for that small group of
habeas petitioners who can make a threshold showing of
innocence.
One of the odd phenomena about the DNA exonerations
is how little attention or condemnation they have generated
in this country. In 1993, a Royal Commission examined the
English justice system and was "struck by evidence of a
disquieting lack of professional competence . ... ,"150 Three
years later, in a book subtitled The Collapse of Criminal
Justice, David Rose wrote that "English criminal justice is
in a crisis without precedent, its solutions uncertain and its
effects deeply damaging."'151 In Canada, the realization that
a single defendant was wrongly convicted of murder led the
Manitoba Justice Minister to commission an inquiry that
made 52an exhaustive study of what went wrong in the
case.

1

But unlike Britain and Canada, and unlike America
149. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
150. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT

20, at 6 (1993).

151. DAVID ROSE, IN THE NAME OF THE LAW: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, at ix (1996).

152. See Manitoba Justice, Thomas Sophonow Inquiry, http://www.gov.mb.ca/
justice/publications/sophonow/ (last visited July 9, 2007).
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when the Scottsboro defendants were convicted, America in
2007 seems supremely unmoved by the failures we see. It is
time-it is past time-that our criminal process took
seriously the problem of appellate courts affirming
convictions of innocent defendants.

